Bangladesh’s upcoming elections could redefine the region’s geopolitical landscape, as Beijing intensifies its strategic engagement while New Delhi’s influence wanes amid deepening tensions and a shifting power dynamic.
The February 12 vote will mark the nation’s return to democratic governance after student-led protests toppled former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s regime in August 2024. Despite India’s continued support for Hasina, who was sheltered during her tenure, Dhaka’s interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has grown closer to China and Pakistan.
Under Hasina, Bangladesh maintained robust trade and defense ties with China—a departure from its close partnership with New Delhi. The recent pivot underscores the shift in power dynamics: “The interim Bangladeshi government is really pivoting toward China,” according to Joshua Kurlantzick, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
China has inked new defense agreements and plans to build a drone plant near India’s border with Bangladesh, further cementing its strategic interests. Delwar Hussain of the University of Dhaka highlights this shift, noting that “Bangladesh now holds central importance in China’s strategy for the Bay of Bengal.”
Muhammad Yunus’s inaugural state visit to China underscores this new alignment. The two countries also finalized a critical defense pact in January, highlighting their strategic partnership.
However, India and Bangladesh continue to clash over human rights issues, with Dhaka disputing reports of violence against minorities—a concern that has strained diplomatic ties. In December, the Indian foreign ministry condemned “unrelenting hostility” toward religious minorities in Bangladesh.
Despite these tensions, both nations have shown pragmatism in their dealings. Praveen Donthi of the International Crisis Group suggests a pragmatic approach: “Both New Delhi and Dhaka recognize the high stakes in not addressing deteriorating relations.”
Dhaka has also normalized ties with Pakistan by resuming direct flights after over a decade, signaling a potential thaw in long-standing animosities.
Experts predict that any new government will likely prioritize stability and avoid disrupting existing relationships. However, even if the BNP, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, wins the election—a scenario that has gained considerable traction—both India and China appear poised to maintain their strategic roles.
Trade relations remain stable, with only one bilateral deal from Hasina’s era scrapped, reflecting mutual dependencies: “China delivers infrastructure in a way India cannot,” remarks former Indian diplomat Dilip Sinha. “But India provides things Bangladesh desperately needs—electricity for the garment industry and yarn.”
While China’s influence deepens, analysts suggest that India-Bangladesh ties won’t necessarily erode; instead, they foresee a coexistence of two robust alliances.
The new administration is expected to continue this pragmatic approach, potentially normalizing ties with Pakistan without undermining its relationship with New Delhi. Even Jamaat-e-Islami, previously at odds with India, has indicated a realistic stance in its campaign promises.
In conclusion, Bangladesh’s election next week represents not just a democratic rebirth but also a pivot toward China and the potential for strategic recalibration among regional powers, navigating complex geopolitical landscapes with increasing depth of engagement and mutual dependencies.